In recognition of increasingly serious environmental constraints to China's development, the Chinese government has decided to invest substantially in an ambitious green transformation of the economy during the last two Five Year Plan periods (i.e. from 2005). The most important strategic goals are:
The ambition in the new five-year Plan is to lower the annual GDP growth rate to 7.5% from around 10% on average over the last 30 years. Yet, China will continue to be the global number one with regard to installed green gigawatts, even with a stagnant share of renewables in total energy supply as is the case now. At the same time, China will install so many new coal power plants that it will account for 90% of the net global increase in coal consumption until 2035. China will produce more CO 2 and emit more CO 2 per capita than any other country before its emissions peak around 2030. Whereas China's need for more energy is legitimate, the challenges for China and the world are significant. China does the following to address them:
It has created a comprehensive regulatory framework for green development with associated measurable targets; the monitoring system for energy efficiency and emission targets will be improved
The new Five Year Plan puts new mechanisms in place to supplement the traditional top down decrees to attain the stipulated targets; an emission trading scheme may be introduced on a pilot basis An absolute energy consumption cap seems to be on the way Local governments will be pressed to toe the line to implement the requisite policy measures China will continue to invest more than any other country in green tech and green development.
It is important for the EU to intensify cooperation with China on its path to a greener economy by using the strategic EU-China partnership to promote green development based on a win-win philosophy. This can be done by:
Conducting annual high-level policy forums on green development Working with European business in China to create a level playing field for Chinese and EU companies Providing technical assistance to make energy regulation more efficient and to support the Chinese government's efforts to push through the necessary policies at the local level Joint leadership training for green development; support to NGOs in their advocacy and training efforts Joint schemes to monitor, audit, and report energy use, efficiency measures, and emissions; work with China for the acceptance of international verification and reporting of its emissions as part of a future climate agreement Finally, expansion of collaboration in R&D, e.g. through triple helix arrangements -i.e. programmes involving the EU Commission, the Chinese government, research organizations, and companies, and targeted joint financing under existing or new programs.
China's green development is the key to its future
China was the first developing country to adopt a national climate strategy in 200 and in 2010 it communicated its greenhouse gas emissions targets to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in compliance with the Copenhagen Accord from 2009, the outcome of the Copenhagen Climate Change Summit in December 2009. Amongst the most important targets are:
China's carbon intensity, i.e. the emission of CO 2 per GDP unit, shall improve by 40-45% from 2005 to 2020
Non-fossil energy (renewable energy and nuclear energy) shall account for around 15% of the primary energy consumption by 2020 (see also table 1).
At its annual gathering in Mach 2011, China's National People's Congress adapted the new 12
th Five-year Plan (FYP) for 2011-2015 which will facilitate the implementation of these targets and their associated sub-targets. The plan promotes a new "green development" approach, which also embraces "low carbon development". There are at least four good reasons that China invests substantial political and financial capital in a greener future:
China's dedication to lower its CO 2 emissions and improve its energy efficiency reflects concerns for its future energy security. Until 1993, China was a net-exporter of oil, while it now imports half of its oil. In 2030, this share will reach an alarming 80%. Natural gas will become a major fuel, with most of it being imported as well. In 2007, China became a net-importer of coal. The share of coal in energy demand is likely to remain just below 70% for years to come.
China has become one of the most polluted countries in the world, not least due to the use of coal. There is an urgent need to lower the consumption of coal and to continue to reduce the emission of sulphur oxides (SOx), nitrogen oxides (NOx), and other traditional pollutants.
China is the world's biggest emitter of greenhouse gases (GHG) and will account for the largest part of additional global emissions in the future. China's own environment is suffering considerably from climate change and China acknowledges that it has an obligation to cut emissions.
China's government is aware that China cannot copy the Western development model and that it has to embark on a more sustainable development path at an earlier stage.
There are still many stumbling blocks on China's road ahead, but the 12 th FYP signals a new step in China's green transformation and its ambition to become one of the world leaders in green development. While the 12 th FYP deals with many issues relating to this, the focus here is primarily on energy and climate change since developments in these areas will have the greatest consequences for the EU, in terms of economy, business, and global climate change.
Thus, the take-off of China's green enterprises in recent years is a wake-up call for the EU. In 2010, China was the world's biggest producer of wind turbines, solar PV and solar thermal panels, electrical and hybrid vehicles, nuclear power plants, hydro power plants, as well as the most energy efficient coal fired power plants. In 2010, China's clean energy investments were the highest in the world, rising to 39.73 bill. € from 29.7 bill. € in 2009. From 2004 to 2009, the market share of Chinese wind energy companies in the national market rose from 25% to almost 87%, and they are now moving into the global market. A similar trend is seen for biomass power, and nuclear power is posted to do the same. The quality gap between Western and Chinese technologies is being closed and China's growth in patent rights of energy technology is catching up with the leading industrialized nations at a surprising speed. Table 1 shows the important overall green energy targets in the 11 th and the 12 th FYPs as well as similar targets in accompanying energy plans. The 11 th FYP energy intensity target was almost attained, but the target for renewable energy -one of the most important -was not fulfilled by any margin. However, the less comprehensive target for green electricity was met and, by 2010, all types of renewable energy (excluding hydro) contributed 1.2% of China's total electricity production. Thus, China met its 2010 target that the major utilities should have 1% of the electricity consumption from non-fossil fuel sources (again excluding hydro). This is to increase to 3% in 2020. The under-fulfillment of the renewable energy target does not signal failure for this sector.
Green energy targets
On the contrary, due to high economic growth, the coal based energy consumption has grown with such a momentum that even a stagnant market share for renewables would actually represent a sharp increase in commissioned power generation equipment. The annual GDP growth rate was planned at 7.5% in the 11 th FYP, but the de-facto rate was 11.2 %. Therefore, the hydro, nuclear, and renewable energy sectors all grew more than anywhere else in the world, as did coal and oil.
The development of non-fossil power capacity has been impressive. China had 1 gigawatt (GW) of wind turbines by 2005, which was upped to 42 GW in 2010, the highest in the world. In 2015, China is expected to have commissioned 100 GW. Nuclear power and solar power experienced a similar trend. Hydro power, by far the largest source of renewable energy, expanded from 117 GW in 2005 to 213 GW in 2010, and is expected to hit another record level of 284 GW by 2015.
From worn to green China model
The turn towards greener development stems from a growing recognition by the Chinese top leadership that the successful and internationally much hyped 'China model' is delivering diminishing returns and has become dangerously worn due to soil, water, and air pollution, environmental degradation, and man-made climate change as a consequence of GHG emissions.
For example, due to China's fast economic growth, energy consumption has more than tripled in 20 years. China is now the world's largest energy consumer. 70% of the energy consumption is based on coal, and the country is expected to commission so many coal power plants that it will account for 90% of the net global increase in coal consumption from 2008 till 2035. China's incremental demand for coal in 2009 and 2010 equals the total EU use of coal. During the 12 th FYP, China is expected to increase its coal based power supply by almost 50%. By 2035 China's stock of newly installed coal-fired power plants will exceed the total capacity of coal-fired power plants in USA, the EU, and Japan combined.
In addition to other contributing factors, coal remains highly critical in creating the negative environmental consequences that are wearing down the China model. China now appears to be facing up to this challenge, both at the national and the international level.
China's impact on global climate change
While China's new policies will contribute to more "green" development, it is clear that the absolute level of energy demand and CO 2 emissions will not decline in the coming years. According to World Bank definitions, with an average GDP per capita standing at about €2.500 in 2010, China is now moving from being a lower middle income country (€755 -€2,982) to an upper middle income country (€2,983 -€9,209), and a better living standard for its citizens requires more energy, be it green or black. China's energy consumption and CO 2 emissions are therefore forecasted to peak only by 2030 in the most ambitious scenario.
Since 2000, China has contributed with nearly 60% of the net global increase in CO 2 emissions. In 2007, China became the world's largest emitter of CO 2 and the per capita emission of CO 2 exceeds the world average. Still, this is about half of the OECD and thus much lower than the EU. But China now contributes with one-quarter of the global CO 2 emissions and its CO 2 emissions are expected to double from 2005 to 2020. If all GHGs are included, China will emit at least two-thirds more in 2020 compared to 2005. The implication is that by 2020 China will surpass the EU or Japan with regard to GHG per capita emissions, while China's GDP per capita remains lower. Even more, China's share of the global emissions will double in 2030 compared to 2000 and by 2035 China will emit more energy related CO 2 than the US, Canada, the EU, and Japan collectively. Therefore, the challenges for China and the global community are both sizeable and tangible. The 12 th FYP points to reduction of domestic carbon and other emissions as a priority during the planning period and it promises an improved system for monitoring these emissions. This is needed nationally but also to assess compliance with the carbon intensity target and to prepare and consolidate the national greenhouse gas inventories that will have to be reported to the UNFCCC regularly.
Comprehensive "green" efforts
China has developed a comprehensive set of policies, strategies, plans, laws, regulations, incentive packages and mechanisms to stimulate the turn towards green development and they are continuously being refined. Although the targets set in these are voluntary and non-binding in the international context, they are, in principle, binding at the national level, even more so after the approval of the 12 th FYP. Key implementation tools, mechanisms, and responsibilities at national and provincial level have been made explicit in subsequent guidelines promulgated by Beijing in August 2011.
The CO 2 emission target combined with an emission trading scheme introduced in the 12 th FYP is now being followed by concrete measures based on pilot testing in recent years. Another important policy will be the adoption of CO 2 taxes on fossil fuels which is expected to be implemented gradually from 2012 or 2013. The CO 2 tax will use market mechanisms rather than the traditional top-down decrees to attain its purpose.
A notable new idea, yet to be implemented, is an absolute cap on energy consumption. Consistent reports suggest a total energy cap of 4.1 bill. tons of coal equivalent (tce) by 2015. This is 25% higher than in 2010 and should be seen against an estimated need of 4.8 bill. tce in 2020 in a business-as-usual scenario. The cap system has the advantage that, if economic growth is higher than expected, the energy intensity must improve beyond the 16 pct. Stipulated in the 12 th FYP in order to comply with the cap. This is a plausible outcome as the GDP rate was underestimated in almost all FYPs during the last 30 years. On the other hand, if the caps are set too high, they may lower the intensity improvements to a level below the 16 pct.
Generally, there is considerable dissatisfaction in China at both leadership level and in academic circles with the national system for monitoring of energy saving and greenhouse gas emissions. The new 12 th FYP implementation measures for energy saving and reduction of emissions from August 2011 propose a number of measures to strengthen this work. Premier Wen Jiabao has previously indicated that this is an obvious area for international collaboration.
Stumbling blocks on the way
The implementation of the green energy and climate policies has not been smooth. Statistics in Table 1 show that the contribution of renewable energy was lower than planned in the 11 th FYP period. To make the disappointing result more palatable, China's Statistical Bureau even reduced the original 15 pct. target of standard renewables for 2020 by redenominating it "non-fossil energy" to be able to include nuclear power.
The reason for under-fulfillment is that the high share of coal has not been reduced as planned. When nuclear power is deducted, the share of renewable energy has actually been stagnant in the past five years.
The new target for non-fossil fuels was also included in China's non-binding emission reductions pledge under the Copenhagen Accord.
Further, it may be argued that the lowered ambitions are also reflected in the climate target of 40-45 pct. improved carbon intensity by 2020, since credible calculations show that this target can be attained by the already adopted energy efficiency policies at only marginal incremental abatement costs.
Twisting the arm of local governments
Clearly, China's central leadership has acknowledged the need for more green policies, but dedicated policies do not always work. Common Western assumptions about a strong topdown rule by the Chinese authoritarian party-state are challenged by the fact that economic reforms and administrative and economic decentralization since the 1980es have stimulated a federalist trend. Local governments are often more responsive to local interests at the expense of long-term investments in clean energy and a better environment, and alliances between party-state officials and enterprise managers in traditional strategic and highly polluting sectors often set the local agenda despite pressure from above and protests from NGOs and local people. Therefore, the central government has now decided to make the top government leader in each province responsible for attaining the energy saving and climate change goals within the province. This may help the implementation, as the central leadership controls the promotion and demotion of these local top leaders, who in turn control the leaders at lower levels.
EU cooperation with China on green development and climate issues
Over the last decades, a number of important programmes have been implemented in the broad field of "green" development with a variety of countries and international agencies, business partners, and NGOs. The EU and its member countries have played a key role in this, and China's central government accords high priority to the continuation of such international collaboration.
China's ability to address its needs differs substantially from most other developing countries. China has the largest foreign currency reserve in the world. China is also the country that has received most support from the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) which transfers large quantities of green tech to China in exchange of emission rights. During the process, China has become a prime mover with regard to production of high end green tech itself and China's enterprises are now set to become major players in the global markets. Half of China's renewable energy projects have received CDM-support and China's CDM projects count for about 60% of all CDM projects worldwide. Other countries have been critical of China's dominance in the CDM arena, and China appears ready to accept a change to the CDM regime in the future, if common consent on a new set of criteria for CDM can be obtained in the international climate change negotiations.
Effectively, China's technology gaps are largely addressed through existing programs. For example, the EU has entered into cooperation with China on Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS), energy efficiency, methane recovery, transmission technology etc. China has also proved quite successful in attracting advanced energy technologies from the world market through normal business activities.
Any notion that the EU would have to distance itself from China to win the race to the top in green development would be ill-conceived. On the contrary, the EU must intensify its cooperation with China on its path to a greener economy due to the magnitude of China's challenges in a global perspective, the serious efforts of the Chinese leadership to transform the economy, and the opportunities in the huge Chinese market throughout its value chains pertaining to green technology and solutions. The EU should take a stake in this, just like China has taken a big stake in the green technologies and solutions offered by the EU.
It is proposed that the EU-China strategic partnership could be used to create a balanced program of joint interventions based on a win-win philosophy through the following measures:
Annual high-level policy forums on green development could be used to help set agendas for collaboration and to evaluate current collaborative efforts under the umbrella.
The EU may also work with European business in China to assist in the efforts to create a level playing field for Chinese and EU companies, for example based on the annual report of the EU Chamber of Commerce to the Chinese government, and through collaboration with regard to standardization. Government-to-government relations are an important corollary to business activities in these areas. Obviously, Chinese companies would expect the same treatment in Europe.
Further technical assistance could be considered in relation to development of integrated systems instead of individual technologies. Energy systems analysis and smart grid systems would be an area, where optimal use of technology would be enhanced by adoption of proper analytical tools, regulation, demand side management, system integration etc. A general quality lift in relation to production, operations, and management in the green value chains in China is also imminent.
Another field of cooperation would be technical assistance to make energy regulation more efficient. As noted earlier, the Chinese energy policies are largely decentralized to lower levels of government and there is a need to streamline the administrative procedures, the pricing structure, and local subsidies.
The EU could also engage with Chinese authorities in various kinds of joint leadership training for green development and it could support NGOs in their advocacy and training efforts to strengthen the role of civil society in green development.
Schemes to monitor, audit and report energy use and energy efficiency measures -e.g. in relation to specific sectors and to GHG emissions -based on qualified, internationally acceptable methodologies need to be developed. With regard to China's climate policy and its specific challenges to monitor and control local emissions, support is needed to develop an efficient accreditation, reporting, and verification system. The importance of this issue cannot be underestimated.
Finally, there is also scope for expansion of collaboration in R&D, with assistance to develop the frameworks for collaboration, e.g. through triple helix arrangements -i.e. programmes involving the EU Commission, the Chinese Government, research organizations, and companies, and targeted joint financing under existing or new programs.
